Pre-Law: Family Law

Marriage Dissolution (Divorce & Annulment)

Facts of The Case: 

Michael H. had an affair with Carole D., who was married to Gerald D. During this affair, Carole gave birth to a daughter, Victoria. Although Gerald was listed as the father on Victoria’s birth certificate (due to the presumption that a child born into a marriage is the husband’s), Michael claimed to be the biological father and sought visitation rights. Paternity tests confirmed Michael was Victoria’s biological father.

Carole and Gerald opposed Michael's attempts to establish parental rights, and under California law, a child born to a married woman living with her husband is legally presumed to be the child of the husband. Michael challenged this presumption as violating his constitutional rights as a biological father.

Rule of Law: 

A biological father does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in forming a relationship with a child born into an existing marriage between the child’s mother and another man.

Final Decision: 

No. The Supreme Court held that the California statute upholding the presumption of legitimacy in marriage did not violate Michael’s constitutional rights.

Citation: 

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)

Name Changes

Facts of The Case: 

The mother of E.F.M., a minor child, filed a petition to change the child’s surname from the father's last name to her own. The parents were no longer in a relationship, and the mother had primary physical custody. She argued that the name change would promote unity within her household and protect the child from confusion or emotional distress.

The father objected to the name change, asserting that he had maintained an ongoing relationship with the child and that the child’s original surname was an important connection to his identity and family heritage.

Rule of Law: 

In a contested child name change case, courts apply the "best interest of the child" standard and may deny a name change if it is not clearly shown to benefit the child more than maintaining the current surname—especially when both parents have a continuing relationship with the child.

Final Decision: 

No. The court denied the petition, finding that the mother had not met the burden of proving that the name change was in the child's best interest.

Citation: 

In re Name Change of E.F.M

Paternity and Child Custody

Facts of The Case: 

Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel had two daughters during their relationship but never married. After Brad died, his parents (the Troxels) requested increased visitation rights with their grandchildren under a Washington state statute that allowed “any person” to petition for visitation at any time. Although Granville allowed some visitation, she limited it to what she felt was appropriate as the children’s mother.

The Troxels petitioned the court for more visitation. A trial court granted them extended rights, but Granville appealed, arguing that the Washington law unconstitutionally infringed on her fundamental right to make decisions about the care and custody of her children.

Rule of Law: 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. State laws that allow third-party visitation must respect this right and cannot override it without justification.

Final Decision: 

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Washington statute violated the Due Process Clause because it interfered with the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.

Citation:

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)

Protection Orders Against Domestic Violence

Facts of The Case: 

Jessica Gonzales had a restraining order against her estranged husband, Simon Gonzales, which required him to stay away from her and her three daughters, except during pre-arranged visitation. One evening, Simon took the children in violation of the order. Jessica repeatedly contacted the Castle Rock, Colorado police, informing them of the violation and asking them to enforce the order. Despite her pleas, the police did not actively intervene.

Hours later, Simon Gonzales appeared at the police station and opened fire. He was killed by police, and the bodies of the three daughters were found in his car. Jessica filed a lawsuit, claiming the police violated her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to enforce the restraining order.

Rule of Law: 

The enforcement of a restraining order is not a constitutionally protected property interest under the Due Process Clause. Police are not constitutionally obligated to enforce such orders in every instance.

Final Decision: 

No. The Supreme Court held that Jessica Gonzales did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order. Therefore, the police's failure to enforce it did not violate her due process rights.

Citation: 

Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)

Guardianship

Facts of The Case: 

John and Annie Santosky were the parents of three children who had been placed in foster care by New York State authorities due to concerns of neglect. After several years and failed attempts at reunification, the state initiated proceedings to permanently terminate the Santoskys’ parental rights.

Under New York law at the time, the state could terminate parental rights based on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, which is a lower burden of proof than "clear and convincing evidence." The Santoskys argued that this lower standard was unconstitutional because it insufficiently protected their fundamental rights as parents.

Rule of Law: 

In proceedings to terminate parental rights, the Due Process Clauses require the state to prove parental unfitness or neglect by clear and convincing evidence, not just by a preponderance of the evidence.

Final Decision: 

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires the state to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence before permanently terminating a parent's rights

Citation: 

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption

Facts of The Case: 

Lehr was the biological father of a child born out of wedlock in New York. The child lived with her mother, Robertson, who later married another man. That man sought to adopt the child with the mother’s consent. Lehr had never lived with or supported the child, and he did not register with New York’s Putative Father Registry, which would have provided him notice of any adoption proceedings.

Lehr only found out about the adoption after it had been finalized, and he challenged it, arguing that he had a constitutional right to be notified and to object to the adoption as the biological father.

Rule of Law: 

A biological father's due process rights are not automatically triggered by paternity alone. To claim a constitutional right to notice or object to an adoption, the father must establish a substantial relationship with the child or take legal steps to assert his parental interest.

Final Decision: 

No. The Supreme Court held that a biological father who has not established a relationship with his child does not have an automatic constitutional right to notice and participate in adoption proceedings.

Citation: 

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)

Juvenile Matters

Facts of The Case: 

Gerald Gault, a 15-year-old boy, was taken into custody in Arizona after being accused of making an obscene phone call to a neighbor. He was arrested without his parents being notified, held without a formal hearing, and later sentenced to a state industrial school until the age of 21. Gault was never formally charged, not given legal counsel, and not afforded a trial with witnesses or cross-examination

If he had been an adult, the maximum punishment would have been a small fine or a short jail sentence—but as a juvenile, he faced six years of confinement with minimal procedural safeguards.

Rule of Law: 

Juveniles in delinquency proceedings are entitled to the same due process as adults, including the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and against self-incrimination.

Final Decision: 

Yes. The Supreme Court held that juveniles are entitled to basic constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in delinquency proceedings.

Citation: 

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

Emancipation and Underage Marriages

Facts of The Case: 

B.R., a 17-year-old minor, filed a petition for emancipation from her parents. She argued that she had been supporting herself financially, was enrolled in school, and lived apart from her parents due to an unstable home environment. B.R. claimed that she made her own decisions, maintained employment, and handled personal responsibilities without parental involvement.

The parents contested the petition, arguing that she was not financially stable enough and still relied on them occasionally, and therefore was not ready for full legal independence.

Rule of Law: 

A minor may be granted emancipation when they can show clear evidence of financial self-sufficiency, residential stability, and the emotional and practical maturity necessary to live independently from parental control.

Final Decision: 

Yes. The court held that B.R. met the statutory requirements for emancipation and granted the petition, legally recognizing her as an emancipated minor.

Citation: 

In re Emancipation of Minor B.R., [Jurisdiction and year vary by state; often unpublished or lower court case]

Loving v. Virginia

Facts of The Case: 

Mildred Jeter, a Black woman, and Richard Loving, a White man, were married in Washington, D.C., in 1958. Upon returning to their home state of Virginia, they were charged with violating Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws, which prohibited interracial marriage. The Lovings pleaded guilty and were sentenced to one year in prison, with the sentence suspended on the condition that they leave Virginia for 25 years. They later challenged the constitutionality of Virginia’s law.

Rule of Law: 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from enacting laws that discriminate based on race unless they serve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored. The Due Process Clause protects individuals’ fundamental right to marry.

Final Decision: 

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found that the law had no legitimate purpose beyond racial discrimination, which is inherently suspect under the Constitution. The statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it treated individuals differently solely based on race. The law also violated the Due Process Clause by restricting the fundamental right to marry. The state’s justification of "racial purity" was deemed insufficient to justify this infringement on individual rights.

Citation: 

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)

Springer v. Springer

Facts of The Case:

In this Florida family law case, the husband and wife divorced, and the trial court entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage. The court awarded the wife alimony and equitably distributed the marital assets. The husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determinations regarding alimony and equitable distribution.

Rule of Law:

Under Florida law, courts must ensure that alimony awards and equitable distribution are based on statutory guidelines, including the financial need of the recipient spouse and the ability of the paying spouse to provide support. The equitable distribution must be fair, considering factors such as contributions to the marriage and the economic circumstances of each party.

Final Decision:

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony and distributing marital assets. The ruling was consistent with Florida law and based on sufficient evidence presented at trial.

Citation: 

Springer v. Springer, 322 So. 3d 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)

Obergefell v. Hodges

Facts of The Case: 

A group of same-sex couples from several states challenged state bans on same-sex marriage and the refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages performed in other states. The petitioners argued that these laws violated their constitutional rights. Lower courts issued conflicting rulings, leading the Supreme Court to resolve the issue.

Rule of Law: 

The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the fundamental right to marry and prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation

Final Decision: 

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that states must both license same-sex marriages and recognize those performed in other states. The Court held that marriage is a fundamental right inherent to individual liberty, and denying same-sex couples this right violated the Due Process Clause. The Equal Protection Clause also requires that same-sex couples be treated equally under the law. The state bans served no legitimate governmental interest sufficient to justify such discrimination. The ruling recognized that marriage provides dignity, legal protections, and stability that should not be denied based on sexual orientation.

Citation: 

Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. 644 (2015)

Santosky v. Kramer

Facts of The Case:

In New York, state authorities initiated proceedings to terminate the parental rights of Peter and Diane Santosky over their three children, claiming the parents had failed to provide an adequate home. Under New York law at the time, the state could permanently sever parental rights based on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the same standard used in most civil cases. The Santoskys challenged the constitutionality of this low evidentiary threshold, arguing that the permanent loss of parental rights required stronger procedural safeguards to protect against erroneous decisions.

Rule of Law:

Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to use a heightened burden of proof, specifically, clear and convincing evidence when seeking to terminate parental rights. Because termination involves a fundamental liberty interest, minimal evidentiary standards are constitutionally inadequate.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Santoskys, striking down New York’s use of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The Court held that parental rights are fundamental and that the state must meet a higher burden of proof to justify their permanent termination, ensuring greater protection for parents facing the loss of their children.

Citation:

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

Troxel v. Granville

Facts of The Case:

After the death of their son, the paternal grandparents sought increased visitation with their granddaughters, but the children's mother, Tommie Granville, who had never married the father, limited their visits. The grandparents filed a petition under a Washington state statute that allowed any third party to request visitation rights at any time, as long as it was deemed in the child’s best interest. The Washington courts granted the grandparents visitation over the mother’s objections. Granville appealed, arguing that the statute infringed on her constitutional rights as a parent to decide what is best for her children.

Rule of Law:

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children. The state cannot override the judgment of a fit parent simply because a judge believes a different decision would be better for the child. Fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests, and courts must give special weight to those decisions.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court struck down the Washington law as unconstitutional, holding that it gave judges overly broad discretion to second-guess parental decisions and infringed on the fundamental rights of parents. The Court emphasized that while visitation by non-parents may sometimes be appropriate, parental rights must be given due deference.

Citation:

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)

Stanley v. Illinois

Facts of The Case:

Peter Stanley lived with the mother of his children for 18 years, raising them together in a stable home, but the couple was never legally married. When the mother passed away, Illinois law automatically classified their children as wards of the state and placed them in foster care, without any hearing or evaluation of Stanley’s fitness as a parent. Under state law, unwed fathers were presumed unfit and denied custodial rights solely because of their marital status, regardless of their actual role in the children’s lives. Stanley challenged the law, arguing that he was being denied his parental rights without due process.

Rule of Law:

The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states from depriving unwed fathers of custody without a hearing on their fitness. Parental rights cannot be denied based solely on marital status without individualized consideration.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Stanley, holding that the state’s policy of automatically declaring unwed fathers unfit violated constitutional protections. The Court emphasized that all parents, regardless of marital status, are entitled to a hearing on their parental fitness before being separated from their children.

Citation:

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Facts of The Case:

A South Carolina couple adopted a baby girl (referred to as “Baby Veronica”) whose biological father, a registered member of the Cherokee Nation, had relinquished custody to the mother before the birth. The adoptive parents had legal custody through private adoption, but the biological father objected under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which aims to preserve Native American families and tribes. A state court sided with the father, removing the child from the adoptive parents after two years.

Rule of Law:

The ICWA is designed to prevent the unwarranted removal of Native American children from their families and tribal culture, but it cannot be used to block voluntary adoptions where the parent has not maintained custody or legal responsibility.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the adoptive couple, holding that ICWA did not apply in this case because the biological father had never had legal or physical custody of the child. The Court emphasized that applying ICWA in this manner would elevate biology over parental responsibility.

Citation:

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013)

Moore v. City of East Cleveland

Facts of The Case: 

East Cleveland had an ordinance limiting the occupancy of a single-family home to nuclear family members. Inez Moore lived with her son and two grandsons (first cousins), violating the ordinance. Can the government restrict extended family members from living together under zoning laws?

Rule of Law: 

The Due Process Clause protects the sanctity of the family, including extended family relationships. The government cannot arbitrarily define family in a way that excludes traditional family structures.

Final Decision: 

The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance.

Citation: 

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)

Palmore v. Sidoti

Facts of The Case:

After a white couple divorced, the mother was initially awarded custody of their young daughter. Sometime later, the mother remarried, this time to an African American man. The child’s biological father filed a petition to modify the custody arrangement, arguing that the daughter would suffer from social stigma and emotional harm due to the interracial household. A Florida court agreed and transferred custody to the father, basing its decision largely on anticipated societal pressures and prejudices that the child might face because of her mother’s interracial marriage. The mother challenged the decision, arguing that it violated her constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause.

Rule of Law:

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state actors from making decisions based on racial classifications, even if done in the name of protecting a child’s welfare. The Court acknowledged that while private racial biases may exist in society, they cannot be used to justify state actions, such as altering custody, because doing so would legitimize those prejudices through the power of the law.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that custody determinations cannot be influenced by racial considerations or assumptions about the social consequences of interracial families. The Court emphasized that the Constitution does not allow the government to give effect to private biases, no matter how pervasive those views may be in society.

Citation:

Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)

Michael H. v. Gerald D.

Facts of The Case:

Michael H., the biological father of a child born to Carole and Gerald D., sought visitation rights after Carole and Gerald’s marriage ended. The child was born during their marriage, and under California law, a child born to a married woman is presumed to be the legitimate child of her husband. Michael challenged this marital presumption, asserting that he had a constitutional right to establish paternity and seek visitation, arguing that he should have a chance to prove his biological relationship to the child.

Rule of Law:

The state may prefer marital relationships and protect the stability of family structures by limiting the rights of biological parents outside of marriage. The presumption of legitimacy within marriage serves the state’s interest in family stability and protecting the child’s relationship with the legal father, even when a biological father seeks parental rights.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court upheld California's presumption of legitimacy, ruling that Michael H. did not have an automatic constitutional right to establish paternity and seek visitation. The Court emphasized the state's long-standing interest in preserving family integrity and the societal preference for maintaining legal ties within marriages.

Citation:

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)

Lehr v. Robertson

Facts of The Case:

Jonathan Lehr, the biological father of a child born out of wedlock, had not taken steps to establish a legal or emotional relationship with the child. When the child’s mother remarried and her new husband petitioned to adopt the child, Lehr was not notified of the adoption proceedings under New York law, which only required notice to fathers who had registered with the state’s putative father registry or taken other formal actions to establish paternity. Lehr challenged the adoption, claiming that his constitutional rights as a biological parent had been violated because he was denied notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Rule of Law:

The Constitution does not automatically grant parental rights to biological fathers; those rights depend on the existence of a substantial parent-child relationship. Due process protections apply only when a biological father has taken meaningful steps to establish a legal and personal connection with the child.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled against Lehr, holding that the state's decision to limit notice to those fathers who had demonstrated a commitment to parenting was constitutional. Since Lehr had not taken legal steps to establish paternity or build a relationship with the child, he was not entitled to notice of the adoption.

Citation:

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)